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Abstract—With the fast expanding scale of vehicular networks,
vehicular edge computing (VEC) has emerged and attracted
growing attention from both industry and academia. Parked
vehicles (PVs) have great potential to join vehicular networks for
sharing their idle computing and networking resources. However,
due to the underlying security and privacy threats, it is challeng-
ing to fairly motivate PVs for resource sharing in an efficient and
secure way. In this paper, we propose a permissioned vehicular
blockchain for secure and efficient resource sharing in VEC,
namely Parkingchain. We first design smart contract to achieve
secure resource sharing and efficient service provisioning between
PVs and service requesters (SRs). A multi-weight subjective logic
based delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT) consensus
mechanism is presented to improve the consensus process in
Parkingchain. Further, we design a contract theory-based in-
centive mechanism to model the interactions between SR and
PVs under asymmetric information scenario. Finally, numerical
results demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanism is
effective and efficient compared with existing schemes.
Index Terms—Vehicular edge computing, vehicular blockchain,
delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance, contract theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of vehicular applications, a
large number of connected vehicles are promoting the amount
of data traffic to reach an extremely high level. For data
processing, computation and communication units are installed
in the vehicles [1]. But these resources are generally un-
derderutilized over time. According to the survey of AAA
Foundation for Traffic Safety, only 50.6 minutes are spent
on average driving per day by an American in 2016 [1].
Furthermore, recent studies have shown that most of individual
vehicles spend a majority of daily time on parking garage,
parking lot, or driveway [2]. In urban areas, parked vehicles
(PVs) are characterized by their numerous amount and long-
time fixed locations [3]. This creates a huge opportunity to
exploit the idle on-board resources (e.g. CPU and GPU) of PVs
for resource sharing in vehicular networks [4], which leads to
a new computing paradigm referred to as the Vehicular Edge
Computing (VEC). In the existing work in the literature, PVs
are utilized as static infrastructures for content downloading
[5], small-scale data center [6] and computation offloading [7].
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In the context VEC, resource sharing between service
requesters (SRs) and PVs may cause security and privacy
threats such as location tracking, falsification, privacy leakage,
node impersonation and remote hijacking [8]. Compromised
PVs would heavily impede security and privacy protection
for SRs via malicious behaviour. For peer-to-peer resource
sharing of the PVs, SRs are generally granted access to
services with necessary identity authentication. Traditionally,
centralized management architectures are used to process
requests and orchestrate services [2], [6]. The central server
becomes a bottleneck and is vulnerable to single point of
failure, remote hijacking, and DDoS attacks [9]. Besides, if
the central authority is compromised, private information of
SRs and PVs may be revealed. Therefore, SRs or PVs may be
not willing to upload requests or execute tasks because of the
concern about data security and privacy leakage. Furthermore,
some of existing studies neglect the incentive compensation
for self-interested PVs which are utilized as infrastructures for
computation and communication [2], [4], [6]. To summarize,
it is necessary to design a secure and efficient incentive
mechanism to motivate PVs to share their idle on-board
resources in VEC.
Due to the characteristics of decentralization, anonymity
and security, blockchain technology enables us to have a
tamper-proof, open ledger, distributed peer-to-peer networks.
The bottleneck of central server and the risks of single point
of failure can be eliminated with decentralized and distributed
storage and management. Blockchain has been widely studied
and applied in vehicular networks, e.g. carpooling services
[10], vehicular data sharing [11], [12] and vehicular trust
management [13], [14]. Moreover, smart contracts are self-
organized scripts residing on the blockchain and allow for
distributed operation of multi-step executions. In this paper, we
design a smart contract that enables idle computation resource
sharing for PVs in Parkingchain coupled with registration
process and transaction execution to achieve the design goals.
One issue regarding the implementation of blockchain tech-
nology is that, the most accepted proof-of-work (PoW) consen-
sus algorithm requires an large amounts of computing power
and has slow confirmation of transactions in conventional
blockchain networks (e.g. Bitcoin) [19]. Most vehicles are
resources-limited (e.g. bandwidth, computation and storage)
and may not be able to meet the complex security require-
ments of PoW. The cost is exorbitant to build a vehicular
blockchain by using computation-intensive PoW [20]. Further,
traditional blockchain such as Bitcoin take up to 30 minutes
for a transaction to be confirmed. However, most of vehicular
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
06
31
9v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 14
 Ju
n 2
01
9
TABLE I: A comparison among some blockchain systems in vehicular networks
Ref. Objective Network Type Consensus Efficiency Transaction
Capacity (tx/sec)
[14] Vehicle communication management Permissioned or private PBFT Scalability and
throughput
Thousands
[15] Vehicle key management Public and totally
decentralized
PoW Slow and high energy
consumption
Sub-ten
[10] Privacy-preserving carpooling Permissioned and
decentralized
PoS Energy efficient Tens
[16] To reach consensus in distributed
software-defined vehicular networks
Private or permissioned PBFT Scalability and
throughput
Thousands
[11] Vehicle data sharing Consortium and
decentralized
PoW Slow and high energy
consumption
Sub-ten
[12] Vehicle data sharing and storage Consortium and
decentralized
PBFT Scalability and
throughput
Thousands
[17] Electric vehicle charging Permissioned and partial
centralized
DBFT High scalability and
high throughput
Thousands
[18] Vehicle data sharing Consortium and partial
centralized
DPoS Energy efficient and
scalability
Thousands
This paper Vehicle computation resource sharing Permissioned and partial
centralized
DBFT High scalability and
high throughput
Thousands
applications have strict delay requirements, e.g. vehicle data
sharing and computation offloading should not wait for several
minutes. Therefore, PoW may not be adapted in vehicular
blockchain. Alternatively, a private ledger with limited access
control, fast confirmation, and low maintenance cost would be
more appropriate in vehicular blockchain.
In this paper, we propose a permissioned vehicular
blockchain for secure and efficient resource sharing in VEC,
which we refer to as the Parkingchain. Firstly, we design a
smart contract that enables PVs’ idle computation resource
sharing coupled with registration process and transaction ex-
ecution in Parkingchain. Secondly, a multi-weight subjective
logic-based delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerates (DBFT) con-
sensus mechanism is presented to improve the consensus pro-
cess in Parkingchain. The PVs with high reputation value are
selected as consensus nodes to audit and store the transaction
records in Parkingchain. Finally, we propose a contract theory-
based incentive mechanism to model the transactons between
the SR and PVs under asymmetric information scenario.
The optimal contracts are analyzed and solved to motivate
PVs with different parking behaviour and energy cost while
maximizing the utility of the SR.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows.
• We design a permissioned vehicular blockchain, referred
to as Parkingchain, where the PVs can share their idle
computation resources with efficiency and security guar-
antee through smart contract operations. A multi-weight
subjective logic-based DBFT consensus mechanism is
presented to enhance the consensus process within the
permissioned vehicular blockchain context.
• We propose a contract theory-based incentive scheme to
model the decision process between the SR and PVs
under the asymmetric information scenario. Within the
proposed framework, optimal contracts are designed to
reward the PVs with different parking behaviour and
energy cost for computation resource sharing while max-
imizing the SR’s utility.
• We present a Lagrange multiplier method-based itera-
tive algorithm to address the optimal contract decision
problem. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed
contract theory-based incentive scheme is effective and
superior to other traditional schemes in terms of the
utilities of SR and PVs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work
is presented in Section II. Section III introduces the system
model with smart contract operations in Parkingchain. The
improved DBFT consensus mechanism is presented in Section
IV. In Section V, we describe contract formulation to provide
incentive for the PVs and discuss the solution. Performance
evaluation results are presented in Section VI before the paper
is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent studies have proposed different consensus algo-
rithms to build vehicular blockchain. Table I compares some
blockchain systems in vehicular networks. We focus on those
existing vehicular blockchain from five aspects: network type,
consensus algorithm, efficiency, and transaction capacity. The
access control decides whether the node is permitted to
join blockchain, and the blockchain can be classified into
permissioned type (e.g. private and consortium blockchain)
and permissionless type (e.g. public blockchain). Any node
in permissionless blockchain (e.g. Bitcoin [19]) is allowed to
achieve the consensus process. On the contrast, the permis-
sioned blockchain (e.g. Hyperledger fabric [21]) needs a group
of authenticated nodes to carry out the consensus process. The
transaction capacity statistics come from [22], which refers to
the protocol white papers and the official documentations. The
transaction capacity statistics only specify the scales of mag-
nitude, i.e. sub-ten, tens, hundreds, or thousands. Note that,
network size of the BFT to process thousands of transactions
per second should be small, typically around several hundred.
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Fig. 1: System model of Parkingchain.
The most accepted PoW consensus algorithm is based on
the fact that if a node performs a lot of work for the network,
it is less likely that it is going to attack it. However, it requires
miners to perform computationally expensive tasks and con-
sume a large amount energy. Proof-of-stake (PoS) is similar
to PoW, but the target value depends on the owned stakes
of nodes. PoS is a consensus mechanism that requires less
computational power than PoW, so it consumes less energy.
Different from PoW and PoS applied in the public blockchain,
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [23] is carried on
by a group of authenticated nodes to validate the transactions.
Some variants, such as delegated PoS (DPoS) and DBFT
select some nodes to generate and validate blocks to achieve
high scalability, high throughput and low latency [24]. In the
proposed Parkingchain, the consensus algorithm converges to
an agreement fast and is superior to a computational-based
algorithm (i.e. PoW algorithm). We design our consensus
phases based on DBFT algorithm to satisfy the requirements
of efficiency in a vehicular networking scenario.
III. SYSTEM MODEL OF PARKINGCHAIN
A. Network Entities in Parkingchain
Traditional blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is a public and
permissionless network. Anyone is permitted to join the
blockchain, finish transactions and carry out the consensus
process. In contrast, permissioned blockchain is a closed and
monitored system where access privilege is well defined and
constrained based on some given roles. As shown in Fig. 1,
Parkingchain is a permissioned vehicular blockchain where
PVs can share their idle computational resources with SRs
in a secure and efficient way. We summarize main network
entities in Parkingchain as follows:
• Service Requester: The potential SRs have demand for
computation resources in various applications, such as big
data processing, scientific research and machine learning.
They acts as general nodes in the overlay P2P network
of Parkingchain. General nodes can relay, transmit, and
exchange ledger data in Parkingchain.
• Parked Vehicle: PVs spend most of time in a day in the
parking garage, parking lot and driveway. With wireless
devices and rechargable battery, PVs can easily commu-
nicate with other vehicles and roadside units by using
existing vehicular communications, such as vehicle-to-
vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication pro-
tocol. PVs have two types of roles in the overlay P2P
network of Parkingchain such as consensus nodes and
general nodes. In addition to directly executing tasks for
SRs, some preselected PVs may act as consensus nodes to
validate transaction, generate block, and build hash chain
over blocks.
• Roadside Unit: In vehicular networks, they are deployed
at the network edge and become proximal access points
for SRs and PVs.
• Trust Authority: Generally, the authority is a government
agency that administers vehicle registration. It is fully
trusted by all the entities in the system and responsible
for issuing public parameters and cryptographic keys to
them.
B. Smart Contract Design for Parkingchain
In this subsection, we design seven steps and operation
details in smart contract for secure resource sharing and
service provisioning in Parkingchain. The transaction between
a SR and a PV is normalized through smart contract. Smart
contracts are resided on Parkingchain with a unique address
and triggered to handle the transactions. Smart contracts are
automatically operated distributedly by network entities in a
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predefined manner. As shown in Fig. 1, the steps of smart
contract in Parkingchain are as follows:
• Step 1: Account registration. The part is to submit a user-
generated account to the trusted authority for necessary
authentication and registration. Asymmetric cryptography
(e.g., RSA or ECC) is utilized in the system initial-
ization for the data integrity and unforgeability. After
registration on a trust authority, e.g., a government depart-
ment, PVj becomes a legitimate entity and gets its pub-
lic/privacy key, certificate and account address (denoted
as PKj , SKj , Certj and accountPVj , respectively).
Each PV’s account format is composed of identity IDj ,
public/privacy key pair (PKj , SKj), certificate Certj ,
account address accountPVj , and average final reputation
value g¯j which is detailedly introduced in Section IV-B.
• Step 2: Request posting. After registration, a SR sub-
mit a request by deploying smart contract with specific
requirements, including size and required computation
resource of the task, expected serving time, and contract
items, e.g., resource-reward pairs (fj , pij). Here, we use
a contract theory-based mechanism to model the transac-
tions between SR and PVs. More details will be given in
Sections V. The smart contract contains a set of state
variables including account addresses of SR and PVj(
accoutSR, accoutPVj
)
, transaction time, and timestamp.
Moreover, the SR have to submit promised reward and
a deposit from their wallet address accountSR to the
smart contract address under public supervision before
posting the request. This deposit will be confiscated by
Parkingchain if the SR submit a fraudulent computation
offloading service.
• Step 3: Request receiving. Authenticated PVs receive the
request from the SR by accessing to the smart contract.
The PVs learn the request requirements and promised
rewards from the smart contract. According to their own
preference, the PVs will decide whether to accept the
request or not.
• Step 4: Contract signing . If PVj would like to serve
the SR, PVj responds to the request and sign the
contract item with its private key SKj via smart con-
tract. Similarly, PVj are required to send a deposit to
smart contract for the quality of completing the task.
Crucial information of SR and PVj such as identities
(IDSR, IDj), certificates (CertSR, Certj), public keys
(PKSR, PKj), account address
(
accoutSR, accoutPVj
)
,
and contract item (e.g. resource-reward pairs (fj , pij)) are
also recorded in the smart contract. To get the reward
from the SR, PVj have to complete the task and feedback
computation result which can be verified by consensus
nodes.
• Step 5: Task execution. After the SR and PVj make
an agreement on the contract items and sign with their
private keys via smart contract, respectively. The task
from will be transmitted to PVj for task execution. After
receiving the task, the PVj will process it and upload the
computation result to the SR and the smart contract for
verification. If PVj leave the parking lot and the task is
interrupted and fails, PVj will not receive any reward
and the corresponding deposit will be sent to the SR
for compensation. Such a punishment design is to ensure
that malicious and misbehaving PVs can not hinder the
service provision for the SR.
• Step 6: Computation verification. The computation result
will be verified by the consensus nodes. The consensus
nodes are composed of preselected PVs with high rep-
utation, which is detailedly presented in Section IV-B.
The computation result should be verified whether the
output result exactly match the input data and the task
requirements. Once the results are unqualified, the deposit
from PVj will be sent to the SR for compensation.
Furthermore, the transaction information will be checked
whether the SR’s and PVj’s accounts and signatures are
legitimate, correct and satisfies the format requirements.
• Step 7: Payment giving. After the computation verifica-
tion stage, the promised rewards and the deposit from
smart contract address are automatically sent to the
PVj’s account address accountPVj . If the computation
verification fails, the promised reward will be sent back
to the SR and the smart contract will rollback. As a
result, the transaction execution is actually the process
of transactions that are being verified and written into
the global ledger.
IV. IMPROVED DBFT FOR PARKINGCHAIN
In Parkingchain, if a new data block is true and reliable, PVs
will have a positive interaction and generate a positive rating
for the consensus nodes. The positive interaction means that
users believe the consensus service and the new data block is
true and reliable [18]. Obviously, it is safe to reach consensus
by PVs with high reputation. On the other hand, misbehaving
PVs in Parkingchain may exhibit malicious behaviours or
have some mistakes. For example, a compromised PV can
be colluded with other malicious nodes and generate fake
ratings, which have a negative influence on the consensus node
selection. Further, an abnormal PV can be a faulty node due
to connection error and does not respond requests from other
nodes during consensus process, which may hinder the process
of reaching consensus. Too many cheating ratings and faulty
nodes in Parkingchain may lead to an unsafe and unstable
environment. Therefore, it is necessary to design a safe and
effective reputation management mechanism in Parkingchain.
Different from traditional PBFT [25], PVs with high repu-
tation are chosen as consensus nodes in the proposed DBFT.
A multi-weight subjective logic model is used to calculate
the reputation values of PVs based on historical interactions.
Subjective logic is a framework for probabilistic information
fusion, which operates on subjective beliefs about the world
[26]. By monitoring behavior, each node’s reputation value can
be evaluated. Opinion is used to represent a subjective belief,
and models positive, negative statements, and uncertainty.
Following [17], [23], we design an improved DBFT consensus
process by using a multi-weight subjective logic model which
is based on local opinions from historical interactions and
takes all the recommended opinions into consideration.
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A. Reputation Evaluation by Using Multi-Weight Subjective
Logic Model
A reputation value of a node can be evaluated by forming
the opinion with subjective logic. The local opinion from
node i to node j is denoted as oi,j , which is a tuple and
is defined as oi,j = (bi,j , di,j , ui,j , ai,j), where bi,j , di,j
and ui,j denote the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty of node
i in node j, respectively, and ai,j is the base rate. Here,
bi,j , di,j , ui,j , ai,j ∈ [0, 1] and bi,j + di,j + ui,j = 1. Let gi,j
denote the reputation value from node i to node j, which can
be computed as gi,j = bi,j + ui,jai,j .
Similar to [27], we consider the multi-weight subjective
logic model for reputation opinion which is defined to measure
the familiarity, timeliness and similarity. We describe them as
follows:
• Familiarity: The familiarity weight factor between PV i
and PV j is denoted as wji . Familiarity is defined as the
interaction frequency between PV i and PV j. A higher
interaction frequency between nodes indicates that PV
i has more prior knowledge about PV j, and the PV i
evaluates the reputation value of PV j more accurately
and reliably. The familiarity weight factor xji between
between PV i and PV j is calculated as
xji =
pi,j
1
|M |
∑
m∈M pi,m
, (1)
where pi,j is the number of past interactions between PV
i and PV j. M is the total number of PV m interacted
with a PV i.
• Timeliness: The time when the reputation opinions oi,j is
established is denoted as tji . The current time slot is t. If
the interaction between PV i and PV j is a recent event,
PV i will have a great impact on the local reputation
opinion on PV j. If the opinion from PV i to PV j is
a past event, the PV i will have less influence on the
local reputation on PV j. The timeliness weight factor
yji between PV i and PV j is calculated with power-law
distribution, which is denoted by
yji = α1
(
t− tji
)−α2
, (2)
where α1 and α2 are two parameters to represent the
impact of interaction timeliness.
• Similarity: The similarity weight factor zji between PV
i and PV j describes how similar the PV i’s behavioral
state is to the PV j’s behavioral state. According to the
[28], PVs arriving at the same time in the parking lot
will have similar parking behavior. It is shown that the
earlier a vehicle is parked, the longer it will stay parked
for. The similarity between PV i and PV j directly affects
the final accuracy of the reputation value. The similarity
value between PV i and PV j is computed as
zji =
1
1 +
∣∣tai − taj ∣∣ , (3)
where tai and t
a
j are the arriving time of PV i and PV j,
respectively.
Leader PV i
PV 1
Misbehaving 
PV j
PV n
Broadcast
Prepare Accept
1 2 3 4
Propose
5
Audit
Reply
Result

Request


SRs
Issue transactions
Fig. 2: The consensus process in Parkingchain.
Considering the familiarity, opinions timeliness and similar-
ity, the overall weight of the reputation segment oi,j can be
computed by wji = γ1x
j
i+γ2y
j
i +γ3z
j
i , where γ1+γ2+γ3 = 1.
After being weighted, the recommended opinions are aggre-
gated with the weights to obtain a synthetic reputation, which
is computed as follow
bsynk,j =
1∑
k 6=j v
j
k
∑
k 6=j w
j
kbk,j ,
dsynk,j =
1∑
k 6=j v
j
k
∑
k 6=j w
j
kdk,j ,
usynk,j =
1∑
k 6=j v
j
k
∑
k 6=j w
j
kuk,j .
(4)
After obtaining the recommended opinions osynk,j , the final
reputation value from node i to node j can be calculated
by combining the local opinion oi,j with the recommended
opinions osynk,j . According to [26], the final opinion is computed
by ofini,j = oi,j ⊕ osyni,j , namely,
bfini,j =
bi,ju
syn
k,j +b
syn
k,j ui,j
usynk,j +ui,j−usynk,j ui,j ,
dfini,j =
di,ju
syn
k,j +d
syn
k,j ui,j
usynk,j +ui,j−usynk,j ui,j ,
ufini,j =
usyni,j ui,j
usynk,j +ui,j−usynk,j ui,j .
(5)
The final reputation value from PV i to PV j is computed as
gfini,j = b
fin
i,j + u
fin
i,j a
fin
i,j .
B. Improved DBFT Consensus Process
• Step 1: Leader selection stage: PVs with high reputation
are chosen as consensus nodes whose reputation val-
ues are calculated with multi-weighted subjective logic
model. The average final reputation values of PVs are
calculated by g¯j =
∑M
i=1 g
fin
i,j
/
M , the top n PVs
with highest average final reputation value are selected
as consensus nodes. We assume that n > 3l + 1,
where l is the maximum number of malicious nodes in
Parkingchain. The n consensus nodes take turn to act
as leader in the consensus process during n time slots.
Each consensus node in Parkingchain is authorized to
perform block generation, broadcasting, verification and
management during its turn.
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• Step 2: Request stage: Requesting SRs send their requests
to all consensus nodes and activate the leader for service
operation. All transactions are aggregated into a new data
block by all consensus nodes. In addition to the leader, the
other consensus nodes are called replica nodes. Firstly,
the leader verifies message authentication codes (MACs)
and signatures of all transactions.
• Step 3: Propose stage: As illustrated in Figure 2, only the
leader is responsible for broadcasting the new data block
to replica nodes at the proposal (pre-prepare) stage. After
receiving the new data block from leader, each replica
nodes verifies MACs and signatures of all transactions in
the new data block.
• Step 4: Prepare stage: The verified results are added to
replica nodes’ digital signatures and are broadcast to all
others. After receiving 2l messages from different nodes,
the prepare stage will be finished and it will enter the
following steps.
• Step 5: Accept stage: After receiving the audit results
from other replica nodes, all consensus nodes compare
them with their own audit results. Then all consensus
nodes broadcast an acknowledgment message to all oth-
ers. If more than n− l consensus nodes agree on the data
block, it replies to the SR and writes the result to the
block.
• Step 6: Reply stage: If the consensus nodes and the
leader receive a certain number of proposal approvals
from the others, they will reply to the SR. If the number
of abnormal nodes is less than (n− l) /3, the consensus
result can be guaranteed correctly.
These classical Byzantine Faulty Tolerant (BFT)-based con-
sensus schemes ensure the properties of deterministic approval
and liveness in Byzantine environment, and are characterized
by low processing delay [29]. The characteristics of leader-
replica hierarchy has message complexity of O
(
n2
)
[30].
Therefore, the BFT-based consensus approaches should be
applied in a small-scale permissioned network with centralized
admission control [20].
V. CONTRACT THEORY BASED OPTIMIZATION FOR
PARKINGCHAIN
In this section, we aim to design an incentive scheme
to motivate PVs to share their idle computation resource
in Parkingchain. Due to the energy cost incurred by task
execution, SR should pay for the computation offloading
services provided by PVs. Nevertheless, there is another issue
to be solved in designing the incentive approach. Obviously,
PVs may leave parking place at any time. The link and
the computation offloading service will be interrupted when
the PVs leave parking place occasionally. It is worth noting
that the parking behaviour of PVs is the private information,
which is known by the PVs themselves but unavailable for
the SR. The SR is not aware of the parking behaviour of PVs,
which leads to the information asymmetry between the SR
and PVs. The asymmetric information causes additional cost
for SR to employ PVs to help offload task. Therefore, it is
necessary to design an incentive scheme which can overcome
the asymmetric information scenario effectively.
Considering that contract theory is a powerful tool from
economics to handle incentive problem under asymmetric
information scenario, we leverage contract theory to design
an incentive scheme to motivate the PVs in Parkingchain. The
SR is modeled as the employer who offers a contract to each
PV. Each contract is composed of a serious of contract items,
which are combinations of resource-reward pairs.
A. PVs Type Modeling
A vehicle’s parking behavior can be described a dual
Gamma distribution [28]. Let tp denote the time that is spent
parked by a PV. The time when the vehicle arrives at parking
lot is denoted as ta. The first-order density of tp is given by
f (tp, ta) =
Hsta
Γ
(
κsta
) (
εsta
)κsta tκsta−1p e− tpεsta
+
H lta
Γ
(
κlta
) (
εlta
)κlta tκlta−1p e−
tp
εlta ,
(6)
where tp > 0, and ta = {0, 1, 2, ..., 23}. The coefficients
κsta , ε
s
ta are the shape and scale parameters that model short-
term parking behavior of PVs, while the coefficients κlta , ε
l
ta
are the parameters that models long-term parking behavior of
PVs. The coefficients Hsta and H
l
ta must always integrate to
one (e.g. Hsta + H
l
ta = 1). Γ (·) is the Gamma function. The
values of these coefficients can be referred to [28].
The proposed blockchain network runs on a slotted-time
basis with the time axis divided into the equal non-overlaping
time slots (Hour) of a day. Let t denote an integer-valued
slot index, tpi , i ∈ {1, ...,M} denote the time a PV has spent
parked, and tai (t) = t − tpi denote the arrival time of a PV.
According to [28], [31], the probability that a PV has at least
τ hours left for parking when it has been parked for tpi , i ∈
{1, ...,M} at time t is given by
P si (t) = P [t > t
p
i + τ |t > tpi ] =
Hsta
i
γ
(
κsta
i
,
t
p
i
+τ
εs
ta
i
)
Γ
(
κsta
i
)
+Hlta
i
γ
(
κlta
i
,
t
p
i
+τ
εl
ta
i
)
Γ
(
κlta
i
)
−Γ
(
κlta
i
)
Γ
(
κsta
i
)
Hs
ta
i
γ
(
κs
ta
i
,
t
p
i
εs
ta
i
)
Γ
(
κs
ta
i
)
+Hl
ta
i
γ
(
κl
ta
i
,
t
p
i
εl
ta
i
)
Γ
(
κl
ta
i
)
−Γ
(
κl
ta
i
)
Γ
(
κs
ta
i
) .
(7)
Obviously, the PVs may leave parking place at any time.
The link and the computation offloading services of the PVs
will be interrupted when the PVs leave parking place. The
probability that a PV leaves after it has been parked for tpi
time, can be expressed by
P oi (t) = P [t ≤ tpi + τ |t > tpi ]
= 1− Pi [t > tpi + τ |t > tpi ] = 1− P si (t) .
(8)
The SR is not aware of the parking behaviour of PVs, which
leads to asymmetric information between the SR and the PVs.
The SR can classify the PVs into some discrete types and use
the statistical distributions of the PVs’ parking behaviour from
historical data to improve its own benefit.
Definition 1: We define the j-th type of PVs θj (t) at time
t as the probability that the PVs has at least τ hours left for
parking when it has been parked for tpj , j ∈ {1, ..., N}
θj (t) = P
s
j (t) = 1− P oj (t) . (9)
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The set of PVs types at time t is denoted as Θ (t) =
{θ1 (t) , θ2 (t) , ..., θN (t)}. The probabilities are sorted in an
ascending order and classified into N types. Θ (t) denotes the
types of PVs at time t and θ1 (t) < ... < θj (t) < ... < θN (t).
In this definition, the higher type of PVs have a higher
probability that the PVs have at least τ time left for parking
when it has been parked for time tpj .
B. Contract Formulation
In order to improve the quality of experience (QoE) of SR,
it is essential for PVs to guarantee the latency requirement of
SR. The satisfaction function model that we use in this paper
is similar to [32]. The physical significance of time saved if
SR offloads a task to type-j PVs is given by
Sj (t) = ρ
(
κs
flocal
− κs
fj (t)
− s
rj
)
, (10)
where ρ is profit coefficient for unit time saved, κ is the
mapping from bit to CPU cycles, s is the size of a task, and
flocal denotes computation capacity that the task is processed
locally. The computation resources shared by the type-j PVs
at time t is denoted as fj (t), and rj denotes the transmission
rate between the type-j PVs and the SR. Obviously, higher
values of fj (t) can provide more benefits to the SR. The SR’s
expected utility with type-j PVs at time t is given by
USRj (t) = P
s
j (t) (Sj (t)− pij (t)) + P oj (t) 0
= θj (t) (Sj (t)− pij (t)) ,
(11)
Under asymmetric information scenario, the SR only knows
the probability of the PVs belonging to a certain type θj (t)
from historical statistics. The probability that the PVs be-
long to type-j at time t can be denoted as: βj (t), and∑N
j=1 βj (t) = 1. The expected utility of SR at time t can
be defined as
USR (t) =
N∑
j=1
βj (t) θj (t) (Sj (t)− pij (t)) , (12)
where pij (t) is the payment from SR for the offloading
services provided by the type-j PVs at time t.
The energy consumption of PVs is modelled by a quadratic
function. Let Ej (t) denote the energy consumption of the
type-j PVs at time t and fj (t) represent the computation re-
sources (i.e. the clock frequency of the CPU chip) contributed
by the type-j PVs at time t. The energy consumption of the
type-j PVs for offloading a task at time t can be defined as
Ej (t) = κsεfj (t)
2
= κsεfj(t)
2
, (13)
where ε is the effective switched capacitance that depends
on the chip architecture. Ej (t) is non-negative and monotone
increasing on fj (t). The enery cost of the type-j PVs at time
t is given by
Cj (t) = eEj (t) = eκsεfj(t)
2
, (14)
where e is price for energy consumption.
The expected revenue of the type-j PVs at time t is
Rj (t) = P
s
j (t) v (pij (t)) + P
o
j (t) 0 = θj (t) v (pij (t)) , (15)
where v (pij (t)) is the evaluation function regarding the re-
ward pij (t) paid by the SR, which is a strictly increasing
concave function of pij (t), and v (0) = 0, v (pij (t))
′
> 0,
and v (pij (t))
′′
< 0 for all pij (t), j ∈ {1, ..., N}. For
j ∈ {1, ..., N}, the expected utility of the type-j PVs under
contract (fj (t) , pij (t)) at time t takes the form of
UPVj (t) = Rj (t)− Cj (t) = θj (t) v (pij (t))− eκsεfj(t)2.
(16)
The expected utility of PVs is the expected revenue minus the
energy cost of task execution.
To simplify the notations, we skip the index t in all the
variables below. The problem of maximizing the expected
utility of the SR (contract design optimization) is formulated
as
max
(fj ,pij)
N∑
j=1
βjθj
[
ρ
(
κs
flocal
− κs
fj
− s
rj
)
− pij
]
s.t. (17a) θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ θjv (pik)− eκsεfk2,
∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} ,
(17b) θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ 0,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} ,
(17c) 0 ≤ f1 ≤ f2 ≤ ... ≤ fmax.
(17)
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint in (17a) guarantees
that the type-j PV can reach the maximum value by selecting
the contract item (pij , fj). Besides, the individual rationality
(IR) constraint in (17b) guarantees that the utility of each type
of PVs is non-negative. To encourage the PVs to share their
computation resources, the reward given by the SR for each
type of PVs must compensate their energy cost. Obviously,
the optimization problem in (17) is not a convex optimization
problem. We will simplify the constraints in the optimization
problem as following.
C. Problem Transformation
It is difficult to solve the optimization problem (17) with the
complicated constraints including N (N − 1) IC constraints
and N IR constraints, which are not-convex and coupled
among different types of PVs [33]. The constraints of (17)
will be reduced through the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: (Reduce the IR constraints) If the utility of the SR
is maximized under asymmetric information scenario, given
that the IC constraints are satisfied, the IR constraints can be
replaced by
θ1v (pi1)− eκsεf12 = 0. (18)
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Lemma 2: For any feasible contract (pij , fj), pij > pik if and
only if θj > θk,∀j, k ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Proof: See [34]. 
Lemma 3: For any feasible contract (pij , fj), pij > pik if and
only if fj > fk,∀j, k ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Proof: See [34]. 
Lemma 4: (Reduce the IC constraints) Based on Lemma 1
and Lemma 2, the IC constraints can be reduced as the local
downward incentive compatibility (LDIC):
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ θjpij−1 − eκsεfj−12,
∀j ∈ {2, ..., N}, (19)
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and the local upward incentive compatibility (LUIC):
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ θjpij+1 − eκsεfj+12,
∀j ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, (20)
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Lemma 5: If the utility of SR is maximized, the IC constraints
can be reduced as
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 = θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12. (21)
Proof: See Appendix E. 
Based on Lemma 1 to Lemma 5, the complicated IR and
IC constraints can be reduced. Therefore, the optimization
problem in (17) can be further simplified as follows
max
(fj ,pij)
N∑
j=1
βjθj
[
ρ
(
κs
flocal
− κs
fj
− s
rj
)
− pij
]
s.t. (22a) θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 = θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12,
∀j ∈ {2, ..., N} ,
(22b) θ1v (pi1)− eκsεf12 = 0,
(22c) 0 ≤ f1 ≤ f2 ≤ ... ≤ fmax.
(22)
The problem in (22) can be easily proved to be a convex
programming problem by checking the convexity of the objec-
tive function and the constraints. Thus, problem (22) can be
solved for the global optimal solution by using the Lagrange
multiplier method.
D. Solution to Optimal Contracts
1) Optimal Contracts for Complete Information Scenario:
Under complete information scenario, the SR is ideally aware
of all PVs’ type. Given that, the SR only has to provide
acceptable contract to the PVs. The SR tries to extract all
the revenue from the PVs to maximize its own utility, which
leaves PVs zero utilities. We set UPVj = 0,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}
and we have,
fj =
√
θjv (pij)
eκsε
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} . (23)
Then we can replace the fj in USRj with (23) and the
IC constraints can be neglected under complete information
scenario. We can obtain the optimal contract
{
f¯j , p¯ij
}
,∀j ∈
{1, ..., N} for each type of PVs by solving dUSRj
/
dpij = 0.
We consider the complete information scenario as a benchmark
case, and take the optimal SRs expected utility under complete
information scenario as the up-bound for the performance.
Lemma 6: Under complete information scenario, the
optimal p¯ij ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} can be obtained by solving
dUSRj
/
dpij = 0,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Proof: See Appendix F. 
2) Local Optimal Contracts for Asymmetric Information
Scenario: Based on constraints (22a) and (22b), we have
equations as follow
fj =

√
θ1v(pi1)
eκsε , j = 1,√
θ1v(pi1)+
∑j
k=2 ∆k
eκsε , 2 ≤ j ≤ N,
(24)
where ∆k = θk [v (pik)− v (pik−1)]. To solve objective func-
tion (22), we replace fj in (22) with (24). We can obtain
the optimal contract
{
f˙j , p˙ij
}
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} for each type
of PVs by solving dUSRj
/
dpij = 0. However, p˙ij ,∀j ∈
{1, ..., N} are not global optimal, because the solution p˙ij
depends on the other solution p˙ij−1.
Lemma 7: Under asymmetric information scenario, the
local optimal p˙ij ,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} can be obtained by solving
dUSRj
/
dpij = 0,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Proof: See Appendix G. 
3) Lagrange Multiplier Method-Based Iterative Algorithm:
Under asymmetric information scenario, we propose a La-
grange multiplier method based iterative algorithm to solve the
optimization problem in (22) without constraint (22c). After
that, we need to check whether the solution of the relaxed
problem satisfies this constraint. Based on the optimization
problem (22), the Lagrangian can be written as
L =
N∑
j=1
{
βjθj
[
ρ
(
κs
flocal
− κs
fj
− s
rj
)
− pij
]}
+
N∑
j=2
ωj
{
θj [v (pij)− v (pij−1)]− eεκs
(
fj
2 − f2j−1
)}
+ η
{
θ1 (pi1)− eκsεf12
}
.
(25)
The Lagrange multiplier associated with the simplified IC
constraints for type θj is ωj , while η is the multiplier
associated with the simplified IR constraint for type-1. For
j ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂fj
=
βjθjρκs
fj
2 − 2eεκsfj (ωj − ωj+1) = 0, (26)
∂L
∂pij
= −βjθj + v′ (pij) (ωjθj − ωj+1θj+1) = 0, (27)
The partial derivatives regarding pij and fj when j = N are
∂L
∂fN
=
βNθNρκs
fN
2 − 2eεκsωNfN = 0, (28)
∂L
∂piN
= −βNθN + v′ (piN )ωNθN = 0. (29)
With constraints (22a), we have
eεκsf2j = θj (v (pij)− v (pij−1)) + eεκsf2j−1. (30)
To solve the optimal contracts
{
f∗j , pi
∗
j
}
, we start the
calculation with the highest type of PVs θN . If f∗N is given,
we obtain ω∗N and pi
∗
N according to (28) and (29). Then, the
optimal contracts
{
f∗j , pi
∗
j
}
for all j ∈ N can be calculated
according to (26), (27) and (30). Hence, we develop Algorithm
1 to obtain the optimal solutions by searching the optimal f∗N
iteratively. However, the obtained set {f∗j } may not satisfy
the constraint (22c). The sub-sequences of the set, which are
not in the increasing order, are called infeasible sub-sequences
[35]. Since {USRj} are concave function, the infeasible sub-
sequences can be replaced by feasible sub-sequences itera-
tively [35]. The details are shown in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Contract Optimization Based on Lagrange
Multiplier Method
Input: {θj}, {βj}, {rj}, ρ, flocal, κ, e, ε
Output: The optimal contract
{
f∗j , pi
∗
j
}
,∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Compute p¯iN and p˙iN by solving dUSRj
/
dpij = 0 under
complete information scenario and asymmetric
information scenario, respectively;
Then we obtain f¯N and obtain f˙N with (23) and (24),
respectively. Set f∗N = f¯N , δ =
f¯N−f˙N
S , j = N ;
while j 6= 1 do
Calculate ω∗N =
βNθNρ
2eεµ3pf
∗
N
with (28) and pi∗N =
ω∗N
βN
− 1
with (29)
for j ← N − 1 to 1 do
Calculate optimal contracts
{
f∗j , pi
∗
j
}
with (26),
(27) and (30));
Calculate U∗PVj with (11);
if U∗PVj < 0 then
Break for
end
end
f∗N ← f∗N − δ
end
while there exists an infeasible sub-sequence {f∗j } do
Find an infeasible sub-sequence {f∗m, f∗m+1, ..., f∗n}
Set f∗j = arg max{f}
∑n
k=m USRk ,∀j ∈
{m,m+ 1, ..., n};
for j ← 1 to N do
Assign the optimal price pi∗j based on (24);
end
end
TABLE II: Simulation parameters
Parameter Setting
Number of misbehaving PVs 10
Interaction frequency between PVs, p U ∼ [5, 10]/minutes
Quality of link, q U ∼ [0.5, 0.9]
Weight of reputation segment, γ1, γ2,
and γ3
0.3, 0.4, 0.3
Predefined parameters of opinions
timeliness, α1 and α2
10, 1.5
Number of type, N 7
Local computation capacity, flocal 0.5 ∗ 109 Hz
Mapping from bit to cycles, κ 104 cycle/bit
Transmission rate, rj 5− 6 Mb/s
Size of a task, s 500 KB
Effective switched capacitance, ε 10−28
Profit coefficient, ρ 0.1
Energy cost coefficient, e 0.1
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Firstly, we evaluate the performance of the proposed Sub-
jective logic based scheme (SL) in DBFT consensus process.
We introduce another traditional linear reputation scheme (LR)
for comparison [27]. Secondly, we give an analysis about
the feasibility of the proposed contract. Thirdly, we conduct
comparisons among the utilities of the SR and the PVs by
varying the time in a day. Finally, we evaluate the utilities
of the SR and PVs with different schemes versus different
Time of day (Hour)
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Fig. 3: Number of PVs versus arrival time.
Misbehaving PVs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rep
utat
ion 
valu
e
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
SL,t=5(mins)
SL,t=10(mins)
LR,t=5(mins)
LR,t=10(mins)
Fig. 4: The reputation values of 10 misbehaving PVs.
types of PVs and In the following figures, the numerical
results are obtained by solving the problem by using pro-
posed Lagrangian-based iterative scheme under asymmetric
information scenario (LIA), local optimization under com-
plete information scenario (LC) and asymmetric information
(LA). For comparisons, we introduce another two incentive
schemes. The first one is the Stackelberg game scheme under
asymmetric information scenario (SA) [36]. The second one
is the linear pricing scheme [37]. Without loss of generality,
we consider v (pij) = ln (1 + pij) ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. The
system performance is simulated using MATLAB with system
parameters in TABLE II.
We adopt the real traces from ACT Government Open
Data Portal dataACT [38]. The data set is from SmartParking
app which is a trial designed to help ease traffic congestion
and lower travel times by using real-time bay sensor data.
This trace was presented from 180295 parking records in
the Manuka shopping precinct in a month. The probability
distribution for the different arrival time of PVs is shown in
Fig. 3. The range of the arrival time is from 3 A.M to 9 P.M.
Based on the number of PVs with different arrival time, the
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Fig. 5: Detection rate of misbehaving consensus nodes over
time.
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Fig. 6: Probability of corrected blocks versus different
reputation threshold value.
probability that the PVs belong to each type at time t can be
calculated.
A. Performance of the Proposed Subjective Logic-Based Rep-
utation Mechanism
In Fig. 4, 10 misbehaving PVs are selected randomly for
reputation updating in a period of time. The update period of
PVs’ reputation is 1 minute. The observation time of our simu-
lation is 10 minutes. Initially, the misbehaving PVs pretend to
act cooperatively. The probability of normally carrying out the
consensus process reaches to 80%. After 5 or 10 minutes, the
misbehaving nodes show the misbehavior and the probability
is dropped to 10%. The reputation values under the LR scheme
are higher than those under the SL scheme. By combining
the reputation opinions and weight adequately by considering
prior knowledge such as familiarity and timeliness, the SL
scheme detects the misbehaviour more clearly. This means that
our approach achieves a sensitive reputation updating which
guarantees secure and efficient consensus in DBFT.
Type of PVs
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Fig. 7: Utility of PVs under two schemes with different type
of PVs.
Fig. 5 shows the detection rate changes under different
schemes over time. As time goes by, the proposed SL scheme
can detect many more misbehaving PVs than the LR scheme.
Moreover, the misbehaving PVs will be detected by the SL
scheme more quickly compared with the LR scheme. When
the threshold reputation value is 0.45, the detection rate under
the SL scheme reaches 100% faster than that with the LR
scheme by 3 minute. With higher value of threshold, the
misbehaving PVs will be easier to be detected. With higher and
faster detection rate in the proposed SL scheme, the potential
security threats can be detected and removed more effectively,
which achieves a secure DBFT consensus process.
As shown in Fig. 6, we evaluate the correct probabil-
ity of block verification with respect to different reputation
thresholds. In the cases with a very low reputation threshold,
the misbehaving PVs may launch the verification collusion
attack. More than 1/3 misbehaving consensus nodes collude
to generate false verification result for block generation. The
correct probability of verified block means that the data block
is correctly verified even in the presence of the verification
collusion attack. When the reputation threshold is 0.45 and
the base rate is 0.5, the correct probability under the proposed
SL scheme is 36% higher than that of the LR scheme.
This indicates that the proposed SL can achieve a secure
block verification, even when attackers launch internal active
consensus nodes collusion.
B. Feasibility of Contract
In order to verify the IR and the IC conditions of the
proposed contract-based incentive scheme under asymmet-
ric information scenario, the utilities of type-3, type-5 PVs
with the proposed Lagrangian-based iterative scheme and LA
scheme are shown in Fig. 7. Each type of PV selects all the
contract (pij , fj), j ∈ 1, 2, ..., N , offered by the SR. Fig. 7
shows that each type of PV can achieve its maximum utility
when it selects the contract that fits its own corresponding
type, which indicates that the IC constraint is satisfied. For
instance, the type-3 PVs achieve the maximum value only
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Fig. 8: Utility of SR under different schemes versus time of
day.
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Fig. 9: Utility of PVs under different schemes versus time of
day.
when it chooses the contract item (pi3, f3). If the type-3 PVs
choose any other contract item (pij , fj), j ∈ 1, 2, ..., N , and
j 6= 3, the utility of the type-3 PVs cannot reach the peak
value compared with the contract (pi3, f3). Furthermore, it can
be seen that each type of PVs selects the contract that fits its
corresponding type and receives a nonnegative value, which
suggests that the IR constraint is satisfied. Therefore, after
choosing the best contract that is designed for its own type,
the type of the PVs will be revealed to the SR. In other s, by
applying the proposed contract-based incentive scheme, the
SR can be aware of the PVs’ hidden information, such as its
type, and thus overcome information asymmetry.
C. Performance Evaluation With Different Time of a Day
The parking behaviour varies significantly along the day and
matches people’s daily routines and habits. Fig. 8 compares
the utility of SR with our proposed LIA scheme with other
four schemes considering different time in a day. As shown
in this figure, the utility of SR with all five schemes achieve
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Fig. 11: Utility of PVs under different schemes for different
type of PVs.
peak value at 9 A.M., with a second smaller peak occurring
again around 12 A.M. This is because, most long-term parking
happens in the early hours of the morning, which coincides
with the hours at which most day jobs begin. The utility of
SR achieves the highest value with the LC scheme, which
can be seen as the upper bound. The proposed LIA scheme
achieves the second best utility which can be seen as the upper
bound under asymmetric information scenario. The proposed
LIA scheme achieves better utility than the SA scheme. The
reason is that, in the contract-based scheme, each contract is
designed for the corresponding PV’s type, and the utility of
SR could be improved by binding the LDICs as described
in Lemma 5 and leave less surplus for the PVs. However,
each type of PVs determines the selling price according to
its own utility which tends to maximize its own utility in the
Stackelberg game-based scheme. The linear pricing scheme
provides the worst utility compared to the other four schemes.
Fig. 9 compares the utility of PVs under five schemes for
different time in a day. As the figure shows, the utility of
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PVs grows rapidly at 10 A.M., reaches the peak values at 11
A.M and the minimum value at 6 P.M. This is because, most
of the people begin their jobs in the early hours and return
home in the afternoon, which leading to the long-term parking
in the morning and the short-term parking in the afternoon.
Furthermore, the PVs’ utility with LC scheme remains zero
all the time which is considered as the lower bound among
five schemes. Since the PVs’ type is observable to the SR
under complete information scenario, the SR can extract the
revenue from the PVs, which leaves the PVs zero utility. The
PVs’ utility with linear pricing scheme achieves the best utility
compared with the other four schemes, followed by the SA
scheme. The reason is similar to that for Fig. 8, each type
of PVs has the freedom to maximize its utility function and
thus can reserve more profit than contract-based schemes. The
proposed LIA scheme gives the second worst performance in
terms of PVs’ utility. This is because, the PVs have limited
contract to select from the SR and thus reserve less profit from
the SR.
D. Performance Evaluation With Different Types of PVs
Fig. 10 illustrates system performance of SR’s utility with
respect to type of PVs. We randomly set a time in a day. Fig.
10 shows that it is profitable for the SR to motivate the higher
type of PVs to contribute their underutilized computation
resources to help offload computing tasks. That because the
higher type of PVs are with higher probability to stay in the
parking place during a short time period, which is more stable
for computation offloading. Furthermore, Fig. 10 provides a
clear gap between the contract-based schemes and those with-
out contract-based schemes. This means, the contract-based
scheme is more efficient than the other two schemes. Also,
we can see that the contract-based scheme under complete
information scenario brings the maximum utility for the SR,
followed by the proposed LIA method-based iterative scheme.
Under asymmetric information scenario, since the SR is not
aware of the type of PVs, the designed IC-based contract
can only bring a approximate optimal utility for the SR,
which is upper bounded by that for the complete information
scenario. The utility of SR under the Stackelberg game scheme
outperforms the linear pricing scheme which gives the worst
performance compared with all these five schemes.
Fig. 11 shows system performance of PVs’ utility with
different types of PVs. As shown in Fig. 11, the utility of
PVs always remains zero when the contracts are designed
under complete information scenario. Except the contract-
based scheme under complete information scenario, the other
four schemes achieve higher utility of PVs with higher PVs’
type. This is because, the higher type of PVs can provide
more stable computation offloading services with the SR
and thus gain more profit than the lower types. Similar to
Fig. 8, the utility of PVs with linear pricing scheme gives
the best performance among all these five schemes. This is
because, each type of PVs can determine their performance
and optimize their self-interest. The SA scheme comes the
second one and outperforms the LIA schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a permissioned vehicular blockchain in
VEC, called Parkingchain, where the parked vehicles (PVs)
can share their idle computational resources with service
requesters (SRs). We have utilized the blockchain technology
and designed a smart contract to achieve efficient resource
sharing of PVs and secure service provisioning. A subjective
logic-based DBFT consensus mechanism has been presented
to enhance the consensus process in Parkingchain. For secure
communications, we have leveraged the multi-weighted sub-
ject logic model to evaluate reputation values of PVs with
higher accuracy. Further, we have proposed a contract-based
incentive mechanism to model the decision process between a
SR and PVs under asymmetric information scenario. Optimal
contracts have been designed to reward the PVs with different
parking behaviour and energy consumption for computation
offloading while maximizing the SR’s utility. Finally, simu-
lation results have demonstrated that the proposed contract-
based scheme is feasible and effective compared with tradi-
tional schemes. In our future work, in order to compute the
reputation value more accurately, we will improve the DBFT
consensus process by taking more factors and weights into
consideration. Also, we will investigate on he application of
machine learning for task allocation to containerized vehicles
in Parkingchain.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We know that the types of PVs satisfy θ1 < θ2 < · · · <
θj < · · · < θN . Combining IC constraints in (22a), we have
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ θjv (pi1)− eκsεf12
≥ θ1v (pi1)− eκsεf12 ≥ 0.
(31)
Therefore, if the IR constraint of type-1 PVs is satisfied, all
PVs will satisfy the IR constraints. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
According to IC constraints in (22a), we have the following
two LDICs:
θj+1v (pij+1)− eκsεfj+12 ≥ θj+1v (pij)− eκsεfj2, (32)
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12. (33)
According to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, if θj > θk, then pij >
pik and fj > fk, ∀j > k,∈ {1, ..., N}. Based on (33), we
have
θj+1 (v (pij)− v (pij−1)) ≥ θj (v (pij)− v (pij−1))
≥ eκsεfj2 − eκsεfj−12.
(34)
Combining (32) and (34), we have
θj+1v (pij+1)− eκsεfj+12 ≥ θj+1v (pij)− eκsεfj2
≥ θj+1v (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12.
(35)
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Thus, we have
θj+1v (pij+1)− eκsεfj+12 ≥ θj+1v (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12.
(36)
The inequality (36) could be extended to prove that all the
DICs are hold. This proof can be shown as
θj+1v (pij+1)− eκsεfj+12 ≥ θj+1v (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12
≥ · · ·
≥ θj+1v (pi1)− eκsεf12.
(37)
Since the proof of LUIC reduction is similar to that of re-
ducing LDIC, we omit the prove here. Therefore, we conclude
that the DICs and UICs hold with the monotonicity, the LDIC
and the LUIC.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
First, we prove that the LDIC can be simplified
as θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 = θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12, which to-
gether with monotonicity can guarantee the LUIC hold. Sup-
pose that the LDICs are satisfied by all type of PVs, and we
have
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 ≥ θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12 ,
∀j ∈ {2, ..., N}. (38)
Notice that the LDIC will still be guaranteed if both pij
and pij−1 are reduced by the same amount. With the aim to
maximize it own utility, the SR will try it best to reduce the
pij until the following equation
θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 = θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12 ,
∀j ∈ {2, ..., N}. (39)
Note that the other types’ LDIC will not be affected by this
process.
Next, we prove that the LUIC will be hold
if θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 = θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12,
∀j ∈ {2, ..., N} and the monotonicity hold. Since we
have θjv (pij)− eκsεfj2 = θjv (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12,
∀j ∈ {2, ..., N}, we have
eκsε
(
fj
2 − fj−12
)
= θj (v (pij−1)− v (pij−1)) . (40)
Due to the monotonicity, if θj ≥ θj−1, then pij ≥ pij−1, we
have
θj (v (pij)− v (pij−1)) ≥ θj−1 (v (pij)− v (pij−1)) . (41)
Combining (40) and (41), we have
θj (v (pij)− v (pij−1)) = eκsε
(
fj
2 − fj−12
)
≥ θj−1 (v (pij)− v (pij−1)) ,
(42)
and thus we have
v (pij−1)− eκsεfj−12 ≥ θj−1v (pij)− eκsεfj2, (43)
which is exactly the LUIC constraint. Therefore, the LUIC can
be removed from the constraints in (22).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
To obtain the optimal contracts under complete information
scenario, we replace fj in USRj with (23) as follows:
USRj = βjθj
ρ
 κs
flocal
− κs√
θjv(pij)
eκsε ,
− s
rj
− pij
 . (44)
Then, we first take a derivative of (44) as follows:
dUSRj
dpij
=
βjθ
2
jρ
2eε
(
θjv (pij)
eκsε
)− 32 dv (pij)
dpij
− 1. (45)
Since v (·) is a strictly increasing function of pij , where v (0) =
0, v′ (pij) > 0, and v′′ (pij) < 0, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. Further, we
observe the derivative of (45) and have
d2USRj
dpi2j
= − 3βjθ
3
jρ
4e2ε2κs
(
θjv(pij)
eκsε
)− 52(dv(pij)
dpij
)2
+
βjθ
2
jρ
2eε
(
θjv(pij)
eκsε
)− 32 d2v(pij)
dpi2j
< 0,
(46)
which indicates that USRj is a concave function on pij , and
there exists the p¯ij that is optimal and maximizes USRj with
given p¯ij .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
To obtain the locally optimal contracts, we first consider
USR1 with type-1 PVs as follows:
USR1 = β1θ1
[
ρ
(
κs
flocal
− κs
µpf1
− s
r1
)
− pi1
]
. (47)
We replace f1 with pi1, according to f1 = 1µp
√
θ1v(pi1)
eκsε .
Then, we can obtain the locally optimal contract
{
f˙1, p˙i1
}
for
type-1 PVs by solving dUSR1/dpi1 = 0.
Further, we consider the locally optimal contracts when 2 ≤
j ≤ N . We replace fj with pij in USRj with (24). Then, we
first take a derivative of USRj as follows:
dUSRj
dpij
=
βjθ
2
jρ
2eε
(
θ1v (pi1) +
∑j
k=2 ∆k
eκsε
)− 32
dv (pij)
dpij
− 1,
(48)
where ∆k = θk [v (pik)− v (pik−1)]. Since v (·) is a strictly
increasing function of pij , where v (0) = 0, v′ (pij) > 0, and
v′′ (pij) < 0, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. We observe the derivative of (48)
and have
d2USRj
dpi2j
= − 3βjθ
3
jρ
4e2κsε2
(
θ1v(pi1)+
∑j
k=2 ∆k
eκsε
)− 52(dv(pij)
dpij
)2
+
βjθ
2
jρ
2eε
{
θ1v(pi1)+
∑j
k=2 ∆k
eκsε
}− 32 d2v(pij)
dpi2j
< 0,
(49)
which indicates that USRj is a concave function on pij , and
there exists the p˙ij that is locally optimal and maximizes USRj
with given p˙ij−1. For j ≥ 2, p˙ij can be obtained by solving
dUSRj
/
dpij = 0 and f˙j can be solved according to (24).
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